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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 960512-CA

::

Priority No. 2

vs.
MICHAEL R. ALLAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (f)
(1992 as Amended) whereby a defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital
felony.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that

the officer had "reasonable suspicion" to justify the stop of
Allan's vehicle?
fold:

The standard of review on this issue is two-

"The trial court's factual findings underlying its

decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are
examined for clear error.

On the other hand, the standard to be

applied to the conclusion of law, i.e., whether the facts as

1

found give rise to reasonable suspicion,
nondeferentially for correctness1."

f

is reviewable

State v. Case, 884 P.2d

1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted).
This issue was preserved during a Suppression hearing (R.
83-105).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when
he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.

STATEMENT QF THE? CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Michael R. Allan appeals from a conviction of Driving Under
the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 41-6-44.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court

Allan was charged by Information with Driving Under the
Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in Fourth Circuit Court, Provo
Department, on or about March 27, 1995 (R. 4-7).
On February 15, 1996, a Suppression hearing was conducted
before the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Jr. at which Allan
challenged whether the initial stop was supported by reasonable

2

suspicion (R. 83-105).
suppress (R. 84-85).

Judge Harding denied Allan's motion to

A bench trial was subsequently held before

Judge Harding on May 28, 1996, at which Allan was convicted of
Driving Under the Influence (R. 71). On July 15, 1996, Allan was
sentenced (R. 73). On or about July 29, 1996, Allan filed a
Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court, Provo
Department, and this action commenced (R. 78).

STATEMENT QF REI*EVANT FACTS
On March 13, 1995, at approximately 7:20 p.m., Officer Brian
Moore of the Provo City Police Department was on routine patrol
in the downtown Provo area (R. 102). At that time, he was
dispatched to the Albertson's parking lot approximately four
blocks from his current location (R. 102). Dispatch indicated
that someone calling from a payphone at Albertson's was reporting
"that they had seen somebody that was intoxicated, and they were
concerned [that person was] going to drive" (R. 101).
When Moore arrived at the parking lot, he looked to the
payphone and saw an individual who was "trying to get my
attention" (R. 101). Moore approached, and the individual
pointed to a person walking in the parking lot who had exited a
red camaro and was then returning to the car—although Moore
"couldnft see him from where I was" and did not see him walking
to the vehicle (R. 97, 100-01).

In fact, Moore only knew the

3

make of the vehicle because the complainant said "This guy in
that red camaro."
Moore testified that his conversation with the individual at
the payphone was "extremely brief" and that at its conclusion,
the complainant walked into the store and was not seen by Moore
again (R. 99-100).

Moore also noted twice that the man "seemed

really nervous for some reason" (R. 96, 100). The complainant
did not leave his name with Moore, nor did Moore ever ask his
name (R. 96). In addition, Moore testified that, at this point,
he had no personal knowledge whether the person pointed out was,
in fact, intoxicated or impaired; and that the complainant gave
him no further information as to his belief of intoxication (R.
95, 100).
Moore then left the complaining individual and drove across
the parking lot to confront the man in the red camaro (R. 99).
Moore testified that "at this time I had reasonable suspicion to
believe that there was possibly an intoxicated person there".
Subsequently, as the red vehicle began to back out of a parking
stall, Moore initiated a stop of the vehicle (R. 99). Moore
testified that his reasonable suspicion of potential intoxication
was based solely upon the information of the pay-phone
complainant with whom, Moore assumed, must have had some basis
for his report (R. 98). Moore did not observe a driving pattern

4

to assess the man's ability to operate his vehicle, he simply
initiated a stop (R. 96).
Eventually Moore arrested the man in the car—Michael Allanf
the defendant—for Driving Under the Influence (R. 98); and at
some point an intoxilyzer test was given and Allan blew .178 (R.
Ill) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures.

An investigatory stop of a vehicle by law enforcement

personnel constitutes a "seizure" under the constitution.
Therefore, it can only be justified by the presence of
"reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity arising from apparent
facts known to the officer prior to the initial stop.

In this

case, there were no apparent facts known to Officer Moore which
were sufficient to support a determination of "reasonable
suspicion" relating to possible intoxication by Allan.
Accordingly, the trial court erroneously denied Allan's motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from the illegal stop; and Allan
asks that this Court reverse his subsequent conviction and remand
the case to the trial court with directions to suppress the
evidence.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE OFFICER
HAD "REASONABLE SUSPICION" TO STOP ALLAN'S VEHICLE
Allan asserts that the trial court committed reversible
error in its denial of his motion to suppress because the initial
stop of Allan's vehicle was not supported by "reasonable
suspicion."
Police stop's of vehicles—regardless of how brief or how
legitimate—constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
1994).

State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App.

Accordingly, a criminal investigation stop—as was

initiated here—must be justified from its inception and must be
limited in its scope.

Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-

20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)).
As in Case, it is the "justificaion" requirement which is at
issue in this case:

Did Officer Moore have "reasonable

suspicion" of criminal activity to justify the stop of Allan's
vehicle?

See, Case, 884 P.2d at 1276.

Such a determination is

based upon an examination of "the totality of circumstances" and
requires "specific and articulable facts" to support the
suspicion.

Id.

Ordinarily the "specific and articulable facts" supporting
reasonable suspicion arise from the personal observations and

6

inferences of the investigating officer.
77.

Case, 884 P.2d at 1276-

However, under certain circumstances—such as this case—an

officer may rely on other sources of information.

Xd.

In such

cases, "the legality of a stop based on information imparted by
another will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts
known to the individual originating

the information...

substantively received and acted upon by the investigating
officer."

Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 (emphasis in original).

In other words "to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry,
it must be determined if, from the facts apparent to the
[investigating] officer and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, that officer would reasonably suspect that defendant
was driving while intoxicated."
(Utah App. 1992).

State v. Rothr 827 P.2d 255, 257

Allan asserts that from the facts apparent to

Officer Moore, he could not have reasonably suspected that Allan
was driving while intoxicated.
In Roth, this Court was presented with another DUI case
arising from an automobile stop which arose from information
imparted to the investigating officer from another.

This Court

affirmed the trial court's determination of "reasonable
suspicion" because "a reliable source with reasonable suspicion
based on articulable facts [had] report[ed] the commission of a
crime, [and] baded on the relayed facts, the dispatcher
communicat[ed] the information to police," and the investigating

7

officer had made personal, articulable observations which
corroborated the information received from dispatch.
P.2d at 259.

Roth, 827

However, the articulated facts apparant to the

officer and to this Court in Roth go far beyond the facts in this
case.
In Roth, the information given to dispatch, and subsequently
relayed to the investigating officer, came from a security
officer whom had observed Roth closely and had made the following
observations relating to potential intoxication by Roth:

slurred

speech, glazed eyes, the smell of alcohol, and an erratic driving
pattern. -Roth, 827 P.2d at 256.

In addition, the security

officer also relayed to dispatch the location, make, color and
license plate number or Roth's vehicle.

Rothr 827 P.2d at 257.

Furthermore, the investigating officer dispatched to Roth's
vehicle observed Roth "having a hard time driving" and personally
noted a slow and jerky driving pattern by Roth prior to the stop
of Roth's vehicle.

Id. at 258.

In this case, no such facts were apparent to Officer Moore,
nor did Officer Moore have any personal observations to
corroborate the pay-phone complainant's allegation of
intoxication against Allan.

Officer Moore observed no driving

pattern by Allan (R. 96). Officer Moore had not seen Allan
walking to his car (R. 95, 100-01) .

Officer Allan had only an

"extremely brief" conversation with the unnamed complainant who

8

"seemed nervous" (R. 96, 99-100).

Moreover, the claimant

expressed no information to either dispatch or to Officer Moore
as to the basis for his belief that Allan was intoxicated.
this Court noted in Case,

As

information about "whom to stop, by

itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are no
articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop is to be
made." Case, 884 P.2d at 1278.
Because there are no apparent facts apparent which establish
reasonable suspicion in this case, i.e. why a stop was required,
Allan asks that this Court hold, like it held in Case, that the
trial court's determination of "reasonable suspicion" was
incorrect and unsupported by the facts.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the initial stop was Allan's vehicle was not
supported by "reasonable suspicion", Allan respectfully asks that
this Court reverse his conviction for Driving Under the
Influence, and remand this matter to the Fourth District Court
with directions that the evidence is to be suppressed and the
matter is to be dismissed.
DATED this

(

day of March, 1997.
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TN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT QS1 UTAH COUNTY
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Case No. 955002886
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MICHAEL R. ALLAN,
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THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, JR.
Fourth District Court Judge
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Rick Romney
City Prosecutorf Provo'
359 West Center Street
Provo, atah 846 01
Telephone: (801)37^-6143

For the Defendant

Thomas H. Means
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT &
ESVI.IN
43 East 200 North
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1

!

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

I

(Electronically recorded on February 15, 1996)
THE COURT:

We'll call the matter of Provo

4

i City vs. Michael Allan.

5

| hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress.

6

|

You may proceed, gentleman.

7

|

MR. ROMNEY:

8

We're here for a suppression

Thank you, your Honor

We call

Officer Moore.

9

j
I

THE COURT:

10

!

COURT CLERK:

11

I testimony you are about to give in this case now

12
13

Very well.
You do solemnly swear that; the

pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole
I truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

14

THE WITNESS:
MR. MEANS:

I do.

15

I

Judge, just by way of

16

J explanation, I'm only challenging the initial

SLOP

in

this case.

19

THR COURT: Very well.
i our testimony to that area.

JO

I

21

MR. ROMNEY:

Thank you.

Why don't we limit
We'll (inaudible)

i your Honor.
BRIAN MOORE

23

!

having been first duly sworn,

24

I

testifies as follows:

25

I

DIRECT EXAMINATION

G0103

1

BY MR. ROMNEY:

2

Q.

Officer Moore, for the record, state your

name and occupation, please.
A.

Brian Moore, patrol officer for Provo City

Police Department.
Q.

Let me call your attention to the 13th of

March, 1995 at about 7:20 in the evening on that date.
8

Were you employed by Provo City and working as a

9

police officer then?

10

A.

I was.

11

Q

Do you recall at that time where you were?

12

A

1 was in the downtown area specifically at

13

that time
Q

Officer Moore, were you on routine patrol

16

A.

Yes. I was.

17

Q.

In your police vehicle?

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

What happened at that time?

20

A.

At this particular time I was dispatched to

14
15

21
22
23

then?

a suspicious call in the Albertson's parking lot.
Q.

How far away from the Albertson's parking

lot were you when you got the dispatch c a U ?

24

A.

Four blocks, tops.

25

Q.

what did you do?

p
A.

I responded to that area.

Q.

Within what time period of having received

the dispatch call?
A.

I would say probably one minute, close to a

minute.
Q.

What happened then, Officer Moore?

A.

I got further information from my dispatch.

They had indicated there was someone on the payphone
at Albertson's, and this individual was indicating
that they had seen somebody that was intoxicated, and[
they were concerned they were going to drive.
Q.

What did you do then when you got to the

parking lot?
A.

When I first got to the parking lot I looked

over to the payphone and saw the individual that was
still on the phone with our dispatch, who wes trying
to get my attention.
Q.

By doing what?

A.

He was waving his hands and pointing,

Q.

Did you approach that person?

A.

I did approach him.

He hung up the phone

and came over towards my vehicle -- I hadn't exited my
vehicle at this time, and he pointed and indicated
that there was an individual walking that had just
gotten out of a red camero and was going back to the

G010.1

s
red camero, and that he believed him to be
intoxicated.
Q.

What vehicle was pointed out to you?

A.

It was just a -- the only red camero in the

parking lot that J saw - - w e were on the southeast
side of the parking lot, and just one row of cars
there, and there was one in chat row.
0-

How long of a conversation did vou have with

this individual who was on the payphone?
A.

Extremely brief.

He seemed really nervous

for some reason.
Q.

What did he do after you had conversed with

A.

Well, after he had conversed with me and

him?

pointed out this vehicle, that an individual was going
to get into the vehicle, that directed my attention, I
felt like that was extremely important to investigate
instead of talk with the individual any longer.
Q.

You didn't have any knowledge yourself as to

whether or not the individual pointed out was
impaired?
A.

I didn't.

T had no pre-knowledge.

I was

! going specifically by what a citizen's complaint was.

And then the citizen turned around v/hen he Icnev/ that I i
was going to invest.igate and went into Albertson 's,

OOKiO

t
and I never saw him again.
Q.

What did you do then after you got the

information from the citizen, Officer?
A.

The parking lot was really congested with

people.

It required me to go ahead and to drive back

around through the parking lot in order to come up to
this vehicle, because it was about four or five cars
back.

From where I was I couldn't back up, there was

a car behind me.

So I went and made contact with the

vehicle.
Q.

By doing what?

A.

At this time I had reasonable suspicion to

believe that there was possibly an intoxicated person
there, so when T came back around I saw the vehicle
had just started to back out of a parking stall, and I
operated my overhead lights to detain them.
Q.

I take it at that point you initiated the

stop of the vehicle by using your lights; is that
correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Now Officer Moore, you indicated that you

had suspicion enough to stop that vehicle.

Indicate,

23

please -- particularize what that was and what it was

24

based on.

25

A.

The stop itself?

iP.il

QQ

8

1

Q.

Yes.

2

A.

Well, I had a citizen who had observed

3

somebody who was potentially intoxicated, and based on

4

what they had told me, it gathered my reasonable

5

suspicion that they had some type of contact with the

6

individual -- I don't know what it was because I was

7

never able to interview them myself.

8

reasonable suspicion I made a stop to investigate in

9

the event that there could be a crime of possible

10

Based on that

serious consequences.

11

Q.

Later on, I take it, you did make an arrest?

12

A.

That is correct.

13

Q.

And v/ere you able to identify the driver of

14

that vehicle?

15

A.

I did.

1G

Q.

By what names and as whom?

17

A.

From what I recall he did have a Utah

18

driver's license in his possession.

19

Q.

Showing the person to be whom?

20

A.

Mr. Michael Allan.

21

Q.

Would you recognize the same person if he

22
23
24
25

were here in this courtroom?
A.

I do.

He is at the defendant's table.

MR. ROMNEY:

Your Honor, for the limited

purposes of this hearing only, that's all the

r.ii

questions I have.
THE COURT:

Very well, thank you.

MR. MEANS:

Thank you.

Mr

Means?

CROSS EXAMINATION
B^ MR. MEANS:
Q.

Officer Moore, the person that called this

in was apparently still on the phone when you arrived
at the Albertson's parking lot?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And you had a brief conversation with him,

and he pointed out the defendant to you?
A.

He pointed out the defendant.

I did not net

visua] contact with the defendant because he was
walking to his vehicle and had already passed my
vehicle, and I just couldn't see him from where I W P S .
Q.

Did you see the defendant walking to his

vehicle?
A.

I did not.

Q.

He pointed out the defendant's vehicle?

A.

He pointed out -- he says, "This guy in that

red camero."
Q.

And where at that time was the defendant?

A.

From what I understood, he was probably

about 10 to 15 feet from his car going to get into his

fi A

n^
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1

car.

2

Q.

To his car?

3

A.

Headed to his car.

4

Q.

So you weren't able to see him walking?

5

A.

I did not see him walking more than just a

6

blur out of the corner of my eye.

7
8

Q.

And by "him11 I was referring to the

j defendant, and you were, too?

9

A.

That's correct.

10

Q.

You didn't see the defendant driving his car

11
12

such that you could observe a driving pattern and
I assess his ability to operate his vehicle?

13

A.

That's correct, I did not.

14

Q.

And when you did get up behind hj s vehicle

15

he had started it and just commenced backing out of

16

his parking space?

17

j

18
19

24
25

Q.

And the citizen that pointed out the

A.

He seemed really nervous, and he just --

j after he knew that I was focusing on Mr. Allan, he

22
23

That's right, the reverse lights were on.

I defendant to you didn't leave his name?

20
21

A.

disappeared.
j

0.

Did he tell you that he didn't want to be

involved then?
A.

That was my presumption, but he didn't

/N *\

s\

r\

specifically indicate that.
Q.

Did he give you any indication as to why he

vas able to determine that this defendant might be
under the influence?
A.

Not to me specifically.

Q.

So if I get the picture, it's a very brief

encounter with this person who is unidentified, he
appears to be very nervous and gave you the impression
that he just wanted to point him out and then get out
of the area, and he didn't give you any indication of
what it was that he observed to draw the conclusion
that he had drawn-A.

All 1 can speculate is from what my

dispatch -- information they gave me.

I can't say for

sure what he told dispatch, but: what I received from
dispatch was that he was impaired walking -- and I
don't know what contact this individual had with him,
but chere was some form.
MR. MEANS:

That's all I have, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. ROMNEY:

Mr. Romney?

I don't have anything else,

your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. ROMNEY:

All right.

You may step down.

Your Honor, one of the other-

officers, in speaking with him, arrived after the stop

ft n

n t:
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had been made, so it would have nothing to add to this
point in time.
THE COURT:

MR. ROMNEY:

Very well.

So that's the evidence that we

have, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Very well.

Mr. Means?

MR. MEANS:

We rest.

THE COURT:

Do you gentleman want to argue

the matter?
MR. ROMNEY:

Your Honor, it's Mr. Means'

motion I'd like to respond to his argument.
THE COURT:

Very well.

MR. MEANS:

Your Honor, the point of making

this motion is just because of the evidence that you
heard.

I know that we have a long line of case lav;

that states that officers can act upon citizen's
information that they have observed, and the
purpose -- as I read this case law, is that citizens
generally are going to tell -- have no motivation,
they are not trying to work out of a charge, they are
not vindictive as a general rule, they are just trying
to cooperate with the police.
And so there's a general -- I think you
start out with a general presumption that what the
citizen tells you is to be, at least on its face,

I*

believed.

And for the record, the officer wasn't able

to cooberate what the citizen observed prior to making
the stop, he didn't see him walking, he didn't see him
driving, he didn't smell his breath, he didn't see his
eyes, just 100 percent on what the citizen told him.
But I think that the reason that those cases
are there is that citizens are willing to step
forward, identify themselves, tell them who chey are
without the fear of repercussion, and give their
information.

But in this case this citizen wasn't --

didn't -- for whatever reason -- didn't cell the
officer why he thought this person was under the
influence.

It was a mere conclusion.

He didn't give

the officer facts that the officer could act upon,
unlike the case where che citizen might come forward
and say, "I just followed this guy all the way down
the canyon and he was weaving all around," something
to give the officer something to base it on other than
the bare conclusion of the citizen.
Beyond that he didn't leave his name.
fact, it was just the opposite.

In

He acted quite

nervous, left the area, didn't give the officer any
way to follow up and get back to him.

The officer is

not able to tell you that he gave dispatch any more
information than he gave the officer.
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And my point is that - - i f that's all it

1
2

takes to get a citizen pulled over in Lhis country,

3

then there are no checks and balances.

4

a grudge who might have been cut-off going into a

5

parking space, or who might be involved in a divorce

6

or some domestic problem can simply call up the police

Anyone who has

and say, "I think so and so is drunk and he's driving
his car," click.

And then the person gets pulled over

and there's no checks and balances.
10
11

And I find that a little bit odd, because
J

12 J

when officers who we know and who this Court has
continued involvement in, even those officers when

13 | they say, "I pulled this person over because I saw a
i
i

14 | driving pattern," the officers themselves are
i

15 j subjected to being placed on the stand and cross
!
16
examined by defense attorneys like me to make sure
17

that they knew what they saw, they were in a position

18

to observe, and they actually did smell the alcohol

19

and were in a position to smell the alcohol, and their
I

20

credibility is assessed, even though we know who they

21

are.

22

And you might have a long experience and

23

have a good feeling of credibility for the individual

24

officers, and I think there ought to be some

25

assessment for the credibility on the basis of

n

A

Al^

'1 b

knowledge of a citizen who remains unidentified to
tell the officers what he saw other than just, "I
think he might be under the influence, that's it, I'm
I out of here."
I

So I think in this case you've got just that

I clear case.

The citizen doesn't want to identify

himself, he just gives a bare bones conclusion with no
I facts to back it up, and the officer is not able,
because of the circumstances, to observe on his own
j cooberating evidence, and he acts entirely upon the
I citizen's information, and I think that there's not
I enough there in this situation for those reasons.
THE COURT:

Mr. Means, if I were to accept

| your representation that that's what the testimony
! was -- or accept your characterization, let's say,
i that that's what the testimony was, and make my ruling
I based thereon, is there a case law that supports your
I position?
i

|

MR. MEANS:

T think that's what Mr. Romney's

going to present to you is case law that supports the
opposite, and I'm trying to distinguish.

There are

I cases where citizens have come forward and given
information to officers and officers have acted upon
it, but in those cases, the citizens have told them
why they suspected the person did or is about to do

r.n ni
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what they did.
Mr. Romney and I were involved in a case
called Warden -- Provo City vs. Warden, and that was a
case where two young boys had flagged over a Provo
City Officer -- it's Devon Jensen from Provo City -and said that this person, who was later the
defendant, just came up to us and said, "Where can I
buy some cocaine?

I want to drive into a wall."

The case stands from the proposition thee
when officers have a reason to believe that someone's
about to do harm to themselves they have a right to
pull them over and find out what's going on.

The

fellow ultimately was charged with a DUI and
convicted.
But at least in that case the two kids gave
the officer some information, they gave a statement
that would cause someone to have alarm and so forth.
Why do you suspect this person is going to cause harm
to himself?

Because he told us this.

In this case, this particular citizen just
simply said, "That guy is drunk.

Take a look at him."

He didn't say, "Well, I think he's drunk because I was
just in the store, I was in the checkout line with him
and I was standing behind him, and boy, he sure
smelled -- and I watched him walk out and he weaved

r> n

on

17

all the way to his car."

It's just bare bones, "He's

drunk."
There's some other cases that Mr. Romney
shared with me, the case of State vs. Roth.

A citizen

had gone to a hospital to get his girlfriend, I think,
who was being discharged -- that's not relevant.

But

at any rate, when he presented himself to the security
guards at the hospital he had the signs of
intoxication, and the security guards reported it, and
another officer responded and pulled the defendant
over.
And I think that's a real easy case to
distinguish that security officers are named, we know
who they are, they have some independent credibility,
they can tell the officer why they thought the person
was drunk because he came - - i n fact, the case states
that they told the arresting officer, "This guy was
just in the hospital, he reeked of alcohol, we thought
he was under the influence but we didn't know he was
driving.

Once we knew he was driving he decided we

needed to call the police."
So I don't have cases that directly support
my argument, but I have cases that say that officers
should be responding on hints or tips that they get,
but all of the cases that support that are from cases
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where the citizen has given some good detailed
information and told the officer why they believed
this person was under the influence or needed to be
looked at for some reason,
THE COURT:
MR. ROMNEY:

Thank you.

Mr. Romney?

Your Honor, if I might -- I

provided those copies for Mr. Means, if I might also
for the Court.
THE COURT:
MR, ROMNEY:

Yes, please.
First of all, as to the Warden

case, I think the pertinent part of that, your Honor,
is headnote No. 5, page 361.

The issue there was one

of hearsay, and the question was whether or not the
unidentified person's statement was hearsay.

It

wasn't, because it went to the officer's belief that
the circumstances were exigent.

The hearsay issue

didn't come up here today, but I do think the same
issue -- the same thing applies in that the officer,
upon hearing that an individual is intoxicated and is
going to get in his car, responds and immediately
needs to do that, and did so.

It explains that he

felt the circumstances were exigent.
I believe that the most compelling case
here, your Honor, is Layton City vs. Moon, and I would
point to headnote No. 1, "Police officer who saw only
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one vehicle dn the parking lot, which he had gone in
response to dispatcher's coded message that an
intoxicated person was about to become an intoxicated
drdver.

Ke verified with the store cleric that ne was

the person dn Question and he observed the vehd cle go
in the lot, and heard his slurred speech," and so on
and so forth, "had probable cause to arrest the
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol."
Your Honor, what we have here is an officer
who goes immediately within literally a minute after
he received the dispatch call from four bloclcs away,
and responded to an individual who was still on th<=»
telephone and pointed out to the officer, "That's the
guy and that's his car, and he's going to get into
it."

J believe, your Honor, that that establishes an

exigency, and the officer needed to do what he did,
and the individual had indicated to the officer tb^u
this was the person, this was the car, he was
intoxicated.

The officer is in fear that an

intoxicated driver is going to drive away and stops
him.
T believe that that's in -- that purports
with Utah case lav/, your Honor, and that the stop was
certainly based on the reasonable .suspicion that the
officer had and that he gained from the citizen
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informant.
I believe Mr. Means has correctly identified
that citizen informants are given the presumption of
J reliability, and I indicate, your Honor, for those
I reasons, that the City would request that the motion

i

to suppress be denied.
I

THE COURT:

Very well.

Mr. Means?

MR. MEANS:

Your Honor, if I could just make I

one statement with regard to the case of Moon that the
i

I prosecutor referred to.

I would point out that in

j that case the person who gave the call to the police

|

officer was the clerk of the Circle K, and he was
i

j still there when the officer responded.
j

By virtue of the fact that the case recites
his name, we can conclude that he gave his name to the
officer so that he could be identified, and he told

i

the officer -- lfm quoting the case, "According to
! Willham," who was the clerk, "Moon stumbled, l'n s
| speech was slurred.

I

When they talked about the open
j

trunk on his car he smelled of alcohol."

And he had

j

I left his car lights on when he came into the Circle K.
j Again, he gave some good detailed information to the
!

i

t

1

officer about why he thought he was under the
i influence.

J

i

I

!

But I think what these cases stand for is

DO 86

I

21

1

you take the statements of these citizens because you

2

can presume they are reliable.

3

are reliable because they are volunteered, number one,

4

and in this case, it was volunteered, so I think they

5

have that.

6

give seme information about why what they told the

7

officer helped them draw the conclusion the person was

8

under the influence.

9

here.

You can presume they

But the people identified themselves, they

We don't have any of that stuff

10

In fact, it's quite the opposite.

11

person gave body language signals to the officer that

12

he didn't want to be involved, that he was nervous,

13

I that he just said, "Hey, that's the guv, he's under
i
J the influence, f! and then he takes off. So that's why
i

14

This

15
I I'm distinguishing this case from the other cases that
1C

j Mr

Romney has cited.

17
THE COURT:

Very well.

Gentleman, I

18
appreciate your arguments.

Mr. Means, I think you

19
raise an interesting issue.

The Court is familiar

20
with this area of the law, and I am able to rule from
21
the bench on it, and I will do so.
22
In this matter the Court finds that there
23
was reasonable suspicion for the stop, and denies your
24
motion to suppress.

It's not without noting, however,

25
that I think you have identified what - - a t least with
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something the Court is not opposed to looking at.
appreciate your bringing in a motion.
MR. MEANS:

Thank you.

I

Thank you.

If we could just get

a trial setting, your Honor.
THE COURT;

Let'SCO.

COURT CLERK;

How much time are v/e looking

au?
MR. ROMNEY:

Do we have the three officers?

I would suppose, Shona, if it's a bench trial, we're
not looking at over an hour.
COURT CLERK:

May 28^h at 2 p.m.

MR. MEANS:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Thank you, gentleman.

We'll see

you back for trial.
(Hearing concluded)
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